Threat intelligence report · AlienVault OTX

Unpacking the AsyncAPI npm supply chain compromise and import-time payload delivery

On July 14, 2026, a coordinated supply chain attack compromised the @asyncapi npm organization, affecting five package versions across four packages. The attack originated from a GitHub Actions workflow vulnerability that exposed privileged credentials, enabling unauthorized code injection. Unlike typical postinstall attacks, this campaign executes at module import time, bypassing common npm install --ignore-scripts protections. The malicious code spawned hidden processes that fetched a second-stage payload from IPFS, deploying the Miasma modular runtime with command-and-control capabilities, persistence mechanisms, and credential harvesting features. The payload included disabled modules for supply-chain propagation, AI-tool poisoning, and sandbox evasion. All compromised packages were published through legitimate GitHub OIDC workflows with valid provenance signatures, masking the malicious activity within trusted release processes.

· unknown severity · unattributed attribution

Evidence and provenance

Original source
AlienVault OTX report ↗
Published
2026-07-16T10:43:41.319000Z
Confidence basis
No actor match
Record ID
e53592c823010d457476

Use and citation

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